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Abstract. Various software architecture viewpoint approaches have been intro-
duced to model the architecture views for stakeholder concerns. To address 
quality concerns in software architecture views, an important approach is to de-
fine architectural perspectives that include a collection of activities, tactics and 
guidelines that require consideration across a number of the architectural views. 
Several architectural perspectives have been defined for selected quality con-
cerns. In this paper we propose the Safety Perspective that is dedicated to en-
sure that the safety concern is properly addressed in the architecture views. The 
proposed safety perspective can assist the system and software architects in de-
signing, analyzing and communicating the decisions regarding safety concerns. 
We illustrate the safety perspective for a real industrial case study and discuss 
the lessons learned. 
Keywords: Software architecture design, software architecture modeling, soft-
ware architecture analysis, safety-critical systems. 
1 Introduction 
To address quality concerns in software architecture views, an important approach is 
to define architectural perspectives that include a collection of activities, tactics and 
guidelines that require consideration across a number of the architectural views [6]. In 
this context, Rozanski and Wood define several architectural perspectives for selected 
quality concerns such as security, performance, scalability, availability and evolution. 
In order to capture the system-wide quality concerns, each relevant perspective is 
applied to some or all views. In this way, the architectural views provide the descrip-
tion of the architecture, while the architectural perspectives can help to analyze and 
modify the architecture to ensure that system exhibits the desired quality properties. 
An important concern for designing safety-critical systems is safety since a failure 
or malfunction may result in death or serious injury to people, or loss or severe dam-
age to equipment or environmental harm. It is generally agreed that quality concerns 
need to be evaluated early on in the life cycle before the implementation to mitigate 
risks. For safety-critical systems this seems to be an even more serious requirement 
due to the dramatic consequences of potential failures. For coping with safety several 
standard and implementation approaches have been defined but this has not been 
directly considered at the architecture modeling level. Hence, we propose the Safety 
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Perspective that is dedicated to ensure that the safety concern is properly addressed in 
the architecture views. The proposed safety perspective is defined according to the 
guidelines as described by Rozanski and Woods [6]. The safety perspective can assist 
the system and software architects in designing, analyzing and communicating the 
design decisions regarding safety concerns. We illustrate the safety perspective for a 
real industrial case study and discuss the lessons learned.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the pro-
posed safety perspective. Section 3 illustrates the safety perspective for an industrial 
case study. Finally, section 4 presents the conclusion.  
2 Safety Perspective 
Rozanski&Woods provide the following guidelines [6]  to define a new perspective:  
• The perspective description in brief in desired quality  
• The perspective's applicability to views  
• The concerns which are addressed by the perspective 
• An explanation of activities for applying the perspective to the architectural design. 
• The architectural tactics as possible solutions when the architecture doesn't exhibit the 
desired quality properties the perspective addresses 
• Some problems and pitfalls to be aware of and risk-reduction techniques  
• Checklist of things to consider when applying and reviewing the perspective to help make 
sure correctness, completeness, and accuracy  
Table 1 shows the proposed safety perspective description including the above 
points. In the following we shortly discuss the each point.  
Table 1. Brief Description of Safety Perspective 
Desired  
Quality 
The ability of the system to provide an information about safety-related decisions and 
ability to control and monitor the hazardous operations in the system  
Applicability Any systems which include hazardous or safety-critical operations  
Concerns Failures, Hazard, Risks, Fault Tolerance, Availability, Reliability, Accuracy, 
Performance  
Activities Identify hazards, Define risks, Identify safety requirements, Design safety model, 
Assess against safety requirements 
Architectural 
Tactics 




Describing the fault tolerance, No clear requirements or safety model, Underestimated 
safety problems 
 
Table 2 shows how the safety perspective affects each of the architectural views as 
defined by Rozanski and Woods [6]. For all the seven views the safety perspective 
seems to be useful and can reshape the corresponding view. The activity diagram in 
Fig. 1 shows the activities for applying the safety perspective. The first step includes 
the identification of the hazards followed by the definition of risks. This is followed 
by identifying and detailing the safety requirements. After the safety requirements 
safety models are designed and the safety requirements are assessed. In the following 
section we explain each activity using an industrial case study.  
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Table 2. Applicability of Safety Perspective to Architectural Views 
View Applicability 
Functional View The functional view allows determining which of the system's functional elements 
considered as safety critical. 
Information View The information view helps to see the safety-critical data in the system 
Concurrency 
View 
While designing the safety-critical systems, some elements need to be isolated or inte-
grated in runtime. Therefore this will affect the system's concurrency structure.   
Development 
View 
Applying this view can help to provide a guideline or constraints to developers in order 
to raise awareness for the system's safety critical elements.  
Deployment View Applying this view can help to determine the required hardware, third-party software 
requirements and some constraints for safety. 
Operational View Safety implementation includes critical and complex operations. Therefore, operational 
view needs to consider safety critical elements to describe system's operation properly.   
Context View Applying this view can help to understand which types of users will use the system and 
which external systems are necessary  to make sure the system operates correctly.   
 
 
Fig. 1. Applying the Safety Perspective 
3 Case Study 
In this section we show the application of proposed safety perspective approach by 
using an avionics control system project of a company. To illustrate the application of 
the proposed safety perspective we have selected "displaying aircraft altitude data" as 
an example requirement for our case study. Altitude is defined as the height of the 
aircraft above sea level. Pilots depend on the displayed altitude information especially 
when landing.  
3.1 Activities for Safety Perspective 
This section explains how the activities given in Fig. 1 are applied to our case.  
Identify Hazards 
In order to identify and classify hazards, preliminary hazard analysis can be con-
ducted which should include the list of all hazards, their probable causes and conse-
quences, and the severity. Hazard severity levels are defined as catastrophic, critical, 
marginal or negligible in [2]. Hazard identification activity is performed with domain 
experts (avionics engineers and pilots), system engineers and safety engineers.  
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We have selected "displaying wrong altitude data" hazard related to selected re-
quirement as an example hazard to illustrate the remaining activities. The possible 
causes of this hazard are loss of/error in altimeter device, loss of/error in communica-
tion with altimeter device and error in display device. Aircraft crash is identified as 
the possible consequence of this hazard. Severity of this hazard is identified as cata-
strophic since possible consequence of the hazard is aircraft crash.  
Define Risks 
To define risks, estimation of probability of hazard occurrence for each hazard should 
be carried out. In [2], occurrence definitions are defined as frequent, probable, occa-
sional, remote or improbable. Based on the hazard severity and hazard occurrence 
class identification, risks should be assessed and categorized as high, serious, medium 
or low [2]. After the risk definition, risk assessment should be conducted by methods 
such as fault tree analysis, event tree analysis, simulation etc. For our case study, our 
design criterion is to design the system such that the probability of occurrence of all 
catastrophic failures should be improbable. Since the selected hazard is catastrophic 
hazard, the probability of occurrence is improbable. According to severity category 
and probability of occurrence, the risk category of the selected hazard is medium.   
Identify Safety Requirements  
After the hazard identification and risk assessment, software safety requirements 
should be determined to construct a safety model. Safety requirements can be identi-
fied by using different methods such as preliminary hazard analysis [7], top-down 
analysis of system requirements and specifications [7] and fault tree analysis [5]. 
Additionally, there are some other methods which combine the several existing tech-
niques to derive safety requirements. To illustrate this step, we produce "Probability 
of displaying wrong altitude should be improbable" as a high-level safety requirement 
related to selected hazard. Many low-level safety requirements can be generated from 
this high-level safety requirement. Examples of the generated low-level safety re-
quirements are (1)"Altimeter data should be received at least two independent altime-
ter devices.", (2) "If the difference between two altimeter values received from two 
altimeter devices is more than a given threshold, the altimeter data should not be 
displayed and a warning should be generated.", (3)"Altimeter data should be shown 
on at least two independent display devices ".  
 
Design Safety Model 
To present the safety-critical elements or components in the system a safety model is 
needed that can be derived from safety requirements. One way to create a safety mod-
el of the system is defining an extension mechanism to UML models [3]. UML exten-
sion can be achieved by adding stereotype to UML diagrams. Another approach to 
design a safety model is defining a domain-specific language [12]. Another way to 
express safety model is using automata [14].  
This activity is an iterative process. The models are created first and then they are 
checked against the safety requirements. The models can be changed according to 
these checks. We prefer to show two versions of the architecture for our case study.  
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The first version is designed without considering the safety requirements. It is  
modified after safety requirements are identified, that is, after safety perspective is 
applied, which results in the second version. The reasons of the modifications will be 
explained in the next section (assessment section). The left part of the Fig. 2 shows 
the deployment diagram of the first version, which includes one avionics control 
computer (AvionicsComputer), one altimeter device (Altimeter), and one display 
device (GR_Display). The deployment diagram of the second version, after applying 
the safety perspective, is shown in the right part of the Fig. 2.  The second version 
includes two avionics control computers (AvionicsComputer1 and AvionicsCompu-
ter2), two altimeter devices (Altimeter_1 and Altimeter_2), and two display devices 
(GR_1_Display and GR_2_Display). Avionics control computer contains following 
modules: M1153 Manager (M1553), A429 Manager (A429), Navigation Manager 




Fig. 2. Deployment View for the First Version (left) and for the Second Version(right) 
M1553 Manager receives data from the devices connected to MIL-STD-1553 
communication channels. Similarly, A429 Manager receives data from the devices on 
the ARINC-429 communication channels. MIL-STD-1553 and ARINC-429 are two 
widely known communication standards used in avionics systems. These two manag-
ers just receive the data and send it to the required modules. They do not make any 
calculations on the data. Navigation Manager receives the altimeter data from M1553 
Manager and A429 Manager and makes the range check and difference check calcula-
tions on the altimeter data. If the difference between two altimeter values received 
from two altimeter devices is more than a given threshold, a warning data is pro-
duced. The altimeter data and warning data are sent to Graphics Managers. Graphics 
Managers drive two graphical displays according to the received data. A well-known 
standard called DVI is used to drive graphical displays. SC (Safety Critical) stereo-
type is defined to tag the safety-critical modules in the second version of the deploy-
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Assess Against Safety Requirements 
After designing the system's safety model, it should be assessed to check whether it is 
consistent with identified safety requirements. There is only one altimeter device and  
one display device in the first version of the architecture so low-level safety require-
ments 1 and 3 are not satisfied. We adapted the first version and included one  
additional altimeter device and one additional display device in the second version of 
the architecture. There are two different altimeter devices and two different display 
devices in the second version so low-level safety requirements 1 and 3 are satisfied.  
Redundancy is also accomplished for the avionics control computer in the second 
version of the architecture. There are two avionics computers which can communicate 
to each other for heartbeat messages (through UDP protocol). They run according to 
master/slave paradigm. Only one of the avionics computers can be master at a given 
time. If slave avionics computer cannot receive heartbeat messages, it can become 
master. Both of them can receive altimeter data and can display it on graphical display 
devices but only the master computer does it. 
Safety requirement 2 is also satisfied in the second version of the architecture. Na-
vigation Manager checks the altitude data and produces either the altitude data or a 
warning for altitude. If altitude data is produced, it is displayed on both graphical 
devices by Graphics Managers. If a warning is generated, a warning symbol is dis-
played on the graphical devices instead of altitude.  Health monitoring is another 
tactic which is applied in order to increase the safety of the system. Health monitor 
checks the status of the modules. If there is a problem related with a module, it can 
restart the module. Health monitors are also used to determine master/slave condition. 
Heartbeat messages are sent and received by health monitors. 
3.2 Architectural Tactics 
Architectural tactics can be considered as possible solutions when the architecture 
does not exhibit the required quality properties addressed by the perspective. In order 
to avoid from failures and hazards, one way is making the system as simple as possi-
ble. Another way is applying redundancy [13] by replicating the components in the 
system. The other way is N-version programming proposed by Chen and Avizienis 
[1]. By using N-version programming technique, different designs can be created for 
each version of the system in order to determine design faults from safety perspective. 
If hazards and failures occur, system should be able to detect them. In order to detect 
the failures, failure detection mechanisms can be derived from safety requirements 
[8]. Another tactic for failure detection is heartbeat [ref] which offers a mechanism 
for periodically monitoring the aliveness and arrival rate of independent runnables. At 
the architecture design level, based on the hazard identification and risk definition, 
consequences of failures can be predicted and reduced/prevented. Redundancy and 
replication also can be used in order to mitigate from the failure consequences.  
Several architectural tactics are utilized for our case study. The first architectural 
technique is redundancy. Several parts of the system are designed as redundant in 
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order to satisfy both safety requirements and high availability needs. This technique is 
applied to avoid from failures and mitigate the failure consequences. Health monitor-
ing technique is applied for failure detection of the safety-critical modules. Table 3 
summarizes the applied tactics. Similar tactics can be applied for other identified cata-
strophic hazards. 
3.3 Checklist 
In this section, we provide checklists in Table 4 for requirements capture and archi-
tecture definition to consider when applying and reviewing the perspective to help 
make sure correctness, completeness, and accuracy. We have applied the checklist to 
our case study. Results are presented in third column of Table 4. All items in the 
checklist are answered as yes except for the item 9. Since our case study doesn't in-
clude any safe state, this question is answered as not applicable. 
Table 3. Architectural Tactics for the Case Study 
Tactic Avoid. Detect. Mitigate 
If one of the altimeter devices produces wrong altimeter output, this 
fault is detected by Navigation Manager and a warning is generated 
  
If one of the display devices crashes and cannot display altitude data, 
the other one continue to display it. 
  
If master avionics computer is not available, the slave avionics comput-
er becomes master and starts to operate. 
  
If a safety-critical module fails, this failure is detected by health moni-
tor. The module is re-started. 
  
Table 4. Checklist Table 
No Explanation Y/N/NA 
1 Have you identified safety-critical operations in the system? Yes 
2 Have you identified possible failures and hazards including causes and consequences 
of them? 
Yes 
3 Have you worked through the hazard severity and occurrence information to define 
the risks? 
Yes 
4 Have you identified availability needs for safety of the system? Yes 
5 Have you worked through example scenarios with your stakeholders so that they 
understand the planned safety risks the system runs? 
Yes 
6 Have you reviewed your safety requirements with external domain experts? Yes 
7 Have you addressed each hazard and risk in the designed safety model? Yes 
8 Is the design of safety model as simple as possible and highly modular? Yes 
9 Have you identified safe states and fully checked and verified them for completeness 
and correctness? 
NA 
10 Have you produced an integrated overall safety design of the system? Yes 
11 Have you defined the fault tolerance of the system? Yes 
12 Have you applied the results of the safety perspective to all effected views? Yes 
13 Have domain experts reviewed the safety design? Yes 
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3.4 Applicability to Views 
Table 5 lists the application of safety perspective to the views for our case study. 
Table 5. Safety Perspective Application for the Case Study 
View Applicability to the case study 
Functional Safety-critical modules are determined (see right part of the Fig. 2) 
Information Safety-critical data is determined (altitude data) 
Concurrency Not applicable 
Development Requirement Standard, Coding Standard, Design Decisions, Reviews / Checklists and 
common processing required are defined. 
Deployment  There are two avionics control computers, two altimeter devices and two display devic-
es. (see right part of the Fig. 2)  
Operational  Check the correctness of the loaded binaries, Software Configuration Management and 
Software Problem Reporting for safety-critical defects are defined, maintenance and 
user training are provided. 
Context  External devices related with safety-critical features are determined. 
4 Conclusion 
Safety-critical systems need to be carefully designed and analyzed because a failure 
may result in death or serious injury to people, or severe damage to equipment. Here-
by, the architecture design plays a crucial role to support the overall design and reali-
zation of the system and ensure the required level of safety. Addressing quality  
concerns at the architecture view level has been actually based on either defining a 
new viewpoint [2] or using architecture perspectives [7], each with their own merits. 
In our earlier work we have considered the explicit modeling of viewpoints for quality 
concerns [9][10][11]. Unfortunately, so far no architectural perspective has been de-
fined for the safety concern. Based on the guidelines by Rozanski and Woods [7] we 
have proposed a safety perspective that can be used in the design of safety-critical 
systems. We have applied the safety perspective in a real industrial context. The safe-
ty perspective helps the designers to explicitly reason about and document the design 
decisions regarding the safety concern. In this respect, the safety perspective appeared 
not only to be useful as a guidance tool for assisting the safety engineer and the archi-
tect, but it also helped in the early analysis of the architecture. In our future work we 
aim to apply the safety perspective for several other domains and consider the trade-
off analysis with the perspectives for other quality concerns. Further we also aim to 
define a viewpoint for safety. 
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